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development of individual cloud-computing environments but a single cloud for all of DoD may not be the optimal solution. This research paper informs strategic leaders as the wisdom of endorsing cloud computing. It addresses related issues in matters of service culture changes and how strategic leaders will dictate the future of cloud computing. Also, in areas of data integrity, cost savings, security, and stability. It challenges the merits of the Secretary of Defense's guidance of immediately adopting a single commercial cloud technology. Furthermore, the author presents two recommendations to meet the goal of lower IT budgets through data center consolidation and individual Service provided cloud computing.
Future of Department of Defense Cloud Computing Amid Cultural Confusion
This country is at a strategic turning point after a decade of war and, therefore, we are shaping a Joint Force for the future that will be smaller and leaner, but will be agile, flexible, ready, and technologically advanced. It will have cutting edge capabilities, exploiting our technological, joint, and networked advantage. Although cloud computing is DoD's way of the future, it may not be the current optimal solution for DoD. This research paper informs strategic leaders as to the advisability of endorsing cloud-computing. It addresses service cultural changes and how strategic leaders will dictate the future of cloud computing. Also, in related issues of data integrity, cost savings, security, and stability. and seek a solution that shadows private industries' practices.
DoD Information Environment
The IT landscape has evolved vastly at all levels over the last 10 years. In the This sudden IT expansion has caused serious security problems throughout DoD. More importantly, it has raised problems with information-sharing through among current small islands of information. The IT footprint expanded, and the cost for new technologies continued to rise. Further, it became a cumbersome challenge to develop interfaces among these systems to share information because each service and agency had developed their own standards and processes.
Like most organizations throughout DoD, the Chief Information Officer (CIO) G6
could not stay ahead of the swiftly changing IT environment. The organization restructured to better provide DoD oversight, but it soon became evident that the newly minted organization inadvertently covers other organization responsibilities; more times 4 than not, it provided conflicting guidance. So providing oversight to DoD on the development and delivery of technology became an insurmountable task. 6 DoD realized that its IT operations had devolved into a state of duplicative, cumbersome, and costly set of application silos. It needed sweeping reorganizational changes as well as a new direction that would provide more responsive, secure, and less costly IT. 7 DoD IT was not disseminating information in a timely fashion due to these separate networks. DoD must now refocus its efforts on information sharing. 8 The total reorganization of the DoD CIO has created more malleability and less redundancy. The new smaller organization gives flexibility and enables teams to be built with up-to-date knowledge and expertise. DoD can now deliver relevant capabilities. 9 Along with this reorganization, DoD CIO teamed with DISA to develop a plan to modernize all of their IT infrastructure, processes, and personnel. The Joint Information Environment (JIE) served as the concept to modernize DoD.
As defined by the 4-Star Joint Chiefs of Staff TANK, the goal of JIE is:
A secure joint information environment, comprised of shared information technology (IT) infrastructure, enterprise services, and a single security architecture to achieve full spectrum superiority, improve mission effectiveness, increase security and realize IT efficiencies. JIE is operated and managed per the Unified Command Plan (UCP) using enforceable standards, specifications, and common tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs).
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This guidance informed DoD that everything from end-to-end must be fixed. With the approved and published strategy to transition DoD departments to an enterprise cloud environment, DISA is now primed to provide a fully synchronized and resilient single enterprise. There are, however, other difficulties that DoD faces besides financing this conversion. This research addresses the skepticism of some experts who question the practicability of cloud-computing. These challenges come in the areas of security, data integrity, cost, and stability. The biggest challenge that will face DoD is the requisite cultural shift within the Services and management of this massive change.
The success of cloud computing finally depends on the actions and attitudes of DoD Strategic Leaders.
Cultural Changes
Three critical competencies exist for those strategic leaders who will execute a robust top-down approach for successful cloud computing. The U.S. Army War College's Strategic Leadership Primer defines strategic leadership as:
The process used by a leader to affect the achievement of a desirable and clearly understood vision by influencing the organizational culture, allocating resources, directing through policy and directive, and building consensus within a volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous (VOCA) global environment which is marked by opportunities and threats. 25 So strategic leaders must then focus on influencing others through processes to achieve an end state by consensus at the highest level. When leaders dispel employers' fears and gain their confidence in the merits of the change, the employees will support the change. The ideal way for change to happen is through a team effort. The Army proved it has the adaptability to undergo major change when it transformed from division-centric brigades to the new modular brigade combat teams.
Cultural and organizational change is needed to achieve the goal of the enterprise. DISA initiated the change process by identifying the requirement for common sets of standardized practices and procedures for all the services. To achieve this commonality, DISA urges all services and agencies to change how they operate and conduct business. This gargantuan change is tantamount to a complete service cultural change. It requires that each service must now act and look and conduct their operations the same as the other their conduct of daily business and the way they provide IT services. Consensus building is the last competency that strategic leaders will need to effect the change to cloud computing. In defining strategic leadership, nowhere do we find the term "decision-making". The words "affecting", "influencing", and "building consensus" have replaced it. Effective consensus builders will not only ensure DISA's success. More significantly, it will ensure the DoD goal remains achievable. Ironically, every concession needed to build a consensus in support of cloud-computing makes the process of implementing the designed change even more complex. Despite these concessions, DISA must be diligent in enforcing the new standards to govern the enterprise.
DoD Strategic Leaders are vital agents in introducing change. They will be responsible for leading their subordinate organizations through the initial stage of change. If they are able to maneuver through this cultural minefield, these leaders will find their work has just begun. Cloud computing is in its infancy and evolving daily.
There are a several additional risks that must be addressed in the proposed transition to DoD's goal of cloud computing.
Data Integrity
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has issued a warning about cloud computing in 2011 from the U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team. The team's advice is directed at small businesses, but is relevant for all users of cloud providers.
The advisory issued to users cautioned them to know what types of information they are storing in the cloud, because they will have little or no control over the stored information. More importantly, they will have no idea who will have access to that data, including inside and outside threats. providers claim storage issues are no longer the customers' concern once they move data into the providers' facilities. Instead they claim the data now belongs to them. 31 Service providers claim that once data becomes their responsibility, they can store it anywhere within their data centers, at any location around the world in accord with the providers' best practices. Another concern is that providers' consolidation of some unclassified data stored with other unclassified data will render this data as classified.
Within public clouds, DoD would lose visibility of where data is stored; also, DoD could not audit this data. So it should not use a public cloud. SLAs can dictate where to store the data to meet all laws and regulations. More stringent the SLA become adds additional costs due to the provider changing how it normally operates. Accordingly, providers must develop cloud service solutions for specific organizations, so the providers cannot rely on their own best practices.
According to Wayne Rash, "cloud providers don't meet current compliance rules.
What is more, some providers, such as Amazon.com, have said that they don't intend to meet those rules and that they won't allow compliance auditors on-site." 32 Army has over 300 data centers; it is executing a plan to move and consolidate to 225 centers, which will yield $1.5 billion in annual savings. 34 The Navy announced in Currently, each Service is moving to a private service cloud. The Army received approval to spend $249M to deploy a private cloud. 36 The Navy is in its final approval process to begin execution of its $1.9B Next Generation Enterprise Network. 37 In 2010, the Air Force has joined forces with IBM to develop a cloud pilot. 38 With the Services already actively planning and using cloud services, DoD must justify the advantages of expending further upfront costs to develop and deploy an additional DISA-sponsored single enterprise cloud environment. No matter which cloud-computing environment chosen, the predominant challenge is the security of the system.
Security
According to President Obama's 2010 U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS), cyber security threats pose the most serious national security, public safety, and economic challenges facing the nation. Defense against cyber-attacks requires networks that are secure, trustworthy, and resilient. The U.S. Government (USG) must protect the digital infrastructure as a strategic national asset. But the USG alone cannot assure cyber security. Only a holistic government-led approach will secure the nation's assets. 39 In fact, U.S. national security is essentially dependent on the world's weakest computer system. Because of the sophistication of both state and non-state actors and this nation's antiquated technologies, standards, and regulations, it is difficult to identify where current attacks originate and to recognize the attackers. More than governments The cyber security threats against DoD and the nation have not gone unnoticed by DoD leadership. Henry Sienkiewicz, Vice Chief Executive for Information Assurance, acknowledges the gravity of cyber threats. He believes cloud computing will create more security hurdles. He predicts that DISA's role will grow. 46 Regina Dugan, Director of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), wastes no words: "The potential capability for cyber mayhem makes cyber security one of the most intense challenges of our time." DARPA has increased it information assurance budget by $88M
for testing IA technologies to address these challenges. 47 The creation of U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) clearly indicates DoD's consciousness of the threat. CYBERCOM will retain the responsibility to protect the DoD network, including a DOD Private Cloud. The security challenge becomes more formidable within a public cloud. CYBERCOM will lose security control of DoD data 16 stored in a commercial service provider. The DoD strategy focuses on cloud computing at the end user level as it continues to develop two-factor authentication, data encryption, and re-training of IT System Technicians into Information Assurance
Specialists. CYBERCOM will continue to do the heavy lifting for cyber defense. 48 The NSS states that cyber security is vital, yet the NDAA directs the consolidation of services and the transition to public service providers. NDAA assumes that commercial providers offer better security than DoD is capable of providing. In January 2013, the USG disclosed that nine major U.S. banks had been under cyberattacks in a sophisticated denial-of-service attack for a number of weeks. The difference from the past attacks was that the attackers commandeered a whole cloud and then used the cloud's own computing power against itself. 49 Every day DoD repels cyberattacks against its networks, but no DoD data centers or clouds have been seized as the manor the of banking system clouds. It is questionable to assume that public providers are more secure than DoD networks. Operating in a single cloud environment, DoD would be incredibly vulnerable to this kind of attack launched a few months ago on U.S. banks.
Stability
As DoD moves to cloud computing, the final concern is the stability of the service providers' data centers. This stability resides in quick access to data and unquestioned assurance of its omnipresent availability. These concerns apply to both public and private clouds. Natural or manmade disasters or simply hardware or software problems can expose vulnerabilities. Many outages have occurred in the last few years, but as technology and service providers' processes improve, these outages should decrease.
Among the biggest outages in 2012 were these of GoDaddy, Salesforce.com, Dropbox, Google Talk, Googles, Microsoft Office 360 (twice), Microsoft Windows Azure, and Amazon (twice). 50 The latest outage happened on Christmas Eve 2012, during which
Amazon experienced a 24-hour outage. 51 Each of these outages lasted only hours, yet they had major effects. Commercially, these outages can mean losses millions of dollars. But for DoD, they could cause a catastrophic loss of national security. DoD may not be able to provide flawless reliable and secure cloud services. But commercial sector has exhibited serious weakness in both the reliability and security of its cloud computing.
Recommendations Recommendation 1
The author recommends the Services preserve their Title 10 Authority and retain the responsibility for the Server Consolidation. Further, Services must continue to develop and manage their own private individual cloud computing environments.
The advantages of executing this recommendation is DoD will capitalize in several areas. First, cost savings have been realized through the services' consolidation IT assets, and through further consolidation of an additional 360 data centers. 52 The DISA Strategic Plan, Key objective 1.1, identifies the merging of the enterprise through the consolidation of data centers. 53 DISA has not released a cost estimate on the overall funding required facilitate it data center goal. However, to consolidate each of the services, a large facility will be required. By each department maintaining its own data centers, DoD will strategically benefit through cost avoidance by requiring no additional funds for a larger facility. The second advantage is that DoD will again recognize savings through cost avoidance for services to provide individual private clouds.
Recently the Army announced its plan for spending $249 million for the development a cloud computing environment. 54 DISA has not announced to the public their cost estimate for a single DoD enterprise cloud. However, for providing only two of the enterprise services there is a cost estimate of $100 million a year. 55 This leads to an educated assumption the cost of integrating all of DoD's data to a DISA cloud will be exponentially higher. Commercial service providers will add further costs for manipulating data to fit within their individual public cloud best practices. The third advantage of individual cloud environments is it eliminates the potential for service culture battles that could jeopardize the entire cloud-computing and data consolidation effort. Finally, by utilizing a more secure cloud environment, the strength of DoD information defense, CYBERCOM, is assured.
A disadvantage of this proposal is the DoD will fall short in meeting the NDAA directive to deploy a commercial cloud or a single enterprise cloud. However, it will meet the intent of server and data consolidation. It also gains the advantage of commercial best practices.
The recommendation to provide individual private clouds, offers the least amount of operational risk to DoD due to the overall strategic cost. By keeping three individual service clouds verses one enterprise public cloud DoD will achieve savings through cost avoidance. Also, it provides the least amount of institutional risk to the entire enterprise as an outage to one particular area of the system and not the entire DoD network. By accepting these adjustments to the strategic goal and end state, DoD is staged to design a single enterprise environment with multiple private clouds. This newly designed DoD environment is prepared to transition to a public cloud once they mature and develop better security and stability. There are two areas that require further research for DoD to achieve the stated strategy on cloud-computing. First, how will DoD provide security to data stored in a commercial data center. A number of effective security measures exist, but each carries associated risks. A mitigation strategy needs careful consideration and planning. Second is users accessing data anywhere, on any device (e.g., mobile devices) carries its own unique security challenges. Both identified research topics exceeded the scope of this paper.
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